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Introduction 
 
Corporations are under increasing pres-
sure to represent themselves to multiple 
audiences, using complex, contested and 
often competing criteria to assess the 
performance of the firm (Cooper & 
Sherer, 1984; Cousins & Sikka, 1993; 
Gray, 1992). No longer is it presumed 
that corporate performance can be made 
transparent through the provision of fi-
nancial information to interested users 
(Andrew, 2001). The firm itself is more 
complicated and the notion of a passive 
identifiable audience is insufficient 
(Macdonell, 1986; Agger, 1992). Not 
only is the very notion of transparency a 
matter for much public debate 
(evidenced by the public discussion gen-
erated by the collapse of private corpora-
tions such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH; 
Baker and Hayes, 2004), but the identity 
of the potential user can not be pre-
sumed (Young, 2006), much less the 
purpose of the reporting process 
(Adams, 2004). As a result, many firms 
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are attempting to respond to these com-
plex expectations, not only to satisfy the 
requirements of the audiences for which 
the information is produced, but also to 
produce and constitute an audience for 
the information that the firm dissemi-
nates (Belkaoui & Karpick, 1989; Cova-
leski & Dirsmith, 1995; Hall, 1997; 
Husted & Allen, 2006).  
 
Cultural practices that respond to, pro-
duce and reproduce social expectations 
have been considered within the field of 
cultural and media studies (Agger, 1992; 
Hall, 1997), and this work is beginning 
to inform research in emerging fields 
such as corporate social responsibility, 
sustainable reporting, environmental 
accounting and ethical finance. This pa-
per utilizes Agger’s (1992) work on me-
dia, culture and representation. I assume 
from the outset that information pro-
duced by corporations is framed discur-
sively by the institutional and cultural 
structures that allow its emergence; it is 
constructed and constructing, productive 
and reproductive, constituted and consti-
tutive. Accordingly, representations of 
and by the firm that fall into the category 
of corporate social responsibility are part 
of a process and are not an end in them-
selves as these can never be controlled 
entirely by the producer or the audience. 
This interactive process will be consid-
ered in more detail throughout the paper. 
It is hoped that this theoretical framing 
of voluntary corporate codes of conduct, 
specifically the Equator Principles, can 
help develop our understanding of the 
purpose, process and possible outcomes 
of these codes.  
 
 
The Equator Principles 
 
A financial industry benchmark 
for determining, assessing and 
managing social & environmental 
risk in project financing 
(www.equator-principles.com) 
 
In 2003, the Equator Principles were 
developed by private lending institutions 
as a way to encourage private lenders to 
consider social and environmental issues 
before funding projectsi. These princi-
ples have focused mainly on issues that 
arise as a result of project financing in 
developing countries and are defined as 
“a financial industry benchmark for de-
termining, assessing and managing so-
cial  r isk in project  f inanc-
ing” (www.equator-principles.com. 
They focus specifically on ‘project fi-
nance’ and although the definition of 
this may be contested within the banking 
and finance literature, for the purposes 
of the Equator Principles it is defined as  
 
a method of funding in which the 
lender looks primarily to the reve-
nues generated by a single project, 
both as the source of repayment 
and as security for the exposure…
Project finance may take the form 
of financing of the construction of 
a new capital installation, or refi-
i Over 40 banks across the globe have adopted the Equa-
tor Principles including ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., ANZ, 
Branco Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Banco Galicia, 
Banco Itaύ, Bank of America, BMO Financial Group, 
BTMU, Barclays plc, BBVA, BES Group, Calyon, Caja 
Navarra, CIBC, CIFI, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse 
Group, Dexia Group, Dresdner Bank, E+Co, EKF, 
FMO, Fortis, HBOS, HSBC Group, HypoVereinsbank, 
ING Group, Intesa Sanpaolo, JPMorgan Chase, KBC la 
Caixa, Manulife, MCC, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Mil-
lennium bcp, Nordea, Nedbank Group, Rabobank 
Group, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotiabank, SEB, Stan-
dard Chartered Bank, SMBC, TD Bank Financial 
Group, The Royal Bank of Scotland, Unibanco, Wacho-
via, Wells Fargo, WestLB AG, Westpac Banking Cor-
poration. Many of these have only recently associated 
themselves with the principles, so it will be interesting 
to see how these banks illustrate their commitment in 
the future. 
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nancing of an existing installation, 
with or without improvements. In 
such transactions, the lender is 
usually paid solely or almost ex-
clusively out of the money gener-
ated by the contracts for the facil-
ity’s output, such as the electricity 
sold by a power plant 
(www.equator-principles.com)  
 
Once a bank became a signatory, the 
lender is able to advertise that they asso-
ciated themselves with projects with 
minimal social and environmental im-
pact and correspondingly, these projects 
would be less likely to threaten the secu-
rity of the lender (Kass & McCarroll, 
2006). The principles acknowledge the 
substantial social and environmental 
impact that financiers can have as they 
often determine the types of projects that 
will progress to development stage.  It is 
argued that they have the power to en-
courage “responsible environmental 
stewardship and socially responsible 
d e ve l o pmen t ”  (www. e qu a t o r -
principles.com). Signatory institutions 
have become known as Equator Princi-
ples Financial Institutions (EPFIs) and in 
2003 they agreed to adhere to the fol-
lowing principles: 
 
1. Review and Categorisation: Con-
duct a social and environmental re-
view of a proposed project and cate-
gorize it in terms of its impact. 
 Categorisation of Projects: 
Category A: Projects with potential 
significant adverse social or 
environmental impacts that are 
d i v e r s e ,  i r r e v e r s i b l e  o r 
unprecedented; 
Category B: Projects with potential 
l imited adverse social  or 
environmental impacts that are few 
in number, generally site specific, 
largely reversible and readily 
addressed through mitigation 
measures; 
Category C: Projects with minimal 
or no social or environmental 
impacts. 
2. Social  and  Envi ronmental 
Assessment: This does not have to 
be done by an independent expert 
unless it is a Category A project, 
social impacts assessed under the 
International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights ICESCR and the 
UN Convention on Human Rights. 
3. A p p l i c a b l e  S o c i a l  a n d 
Environmental Standards must be 
followed (this includes host country 
laws, IFC Performance Standards) 
4. Action Plan and Management 
System: This must address any 
finding in the assessment; it will 
describe any actions needed to 
implement mitigation measures, 
corrective actions and monitoring 
measures necessary to manage the 
impacts and risks. Borrowers must 
design a Social and Environmental 
Management System that addresses 
the management of these impacts, 
risks and corrective regulations. 
5. Consultation and Disclosure: 
Consult with communities affected 
by the project. 
6. G r i e v a n c e  M e c h a n i s m : 
Communities will have the right to 
have their grievances heard and 
addressed by the borrower (this is 
not independent of the lender and 
does not make provisions for an 
independent third party to oversee 
the process). 
7. Independent Review: A social or 
environmental expert not directly 
associated with the borrower will 
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review the assessment, action plan 
and consultation process. 
8. Covenants: covenants linked 
compliance. 
9. Independent Monitoring and 
R e p o r t i n g :  I n d e p e n d e n t 
environmental or social expert 
monitor and report on compliance 
over the course of the loan. 
 
In 2003, this provided a starting point 
for the Equator project, but there were 
some significant problems. Specifically, 
these principles did not include a review 
body and there were no formally identi-
fied disclosure or transparency require-
ments. This meant that financial institu-
tions could become signatories without 
there being any formal mechanism to 
scrutinize the way the institutions had 
integrated the principles. Wright and 
Rwabizambuga (2006, p.91) argue that 
this meant “that all Equator banks gain 
some reputational benefits irrespective 
of their actual practices”. In order to ad-
dress these concerns, a revised version 
of the Equator Principles were issued in 
2006. A number of other changes were 
incorporated in these revised principles.  
Specifically, the applicability of the 
principles expanded to include projects 
more than $10 million whereas previ-
ously the principle affected projects 
costing more than $50million; the prin-
ciples now apply to the expansion and 
upgrade of existing projects that result in 
new social and environmental impacts; 
EPFI’s need to report on the progress 
and implementation of the Equator Prin-
ciples at least annually  (as outlined be-
low); there are tighter rules regarding 
public consultation and the handling of 
grievances; and there are stronger cove-
nants to ensure compliance with the 
policies. Perhaps the most significant 
change has been the inclusions of the 
10th principle on EPFI Reporting stating 
that  
 
10. Each EPFI adopting the Equator 
Principles commits to report 
publicly at least annually about its 
Equator Principles implementation 
processes and experience, taking 
i n t o  a c coun t  a pp rop r i a t e 
confidentiality considerations 
(www.equator-principles.com) 
 
Although this principle acknowledges 
the importance of transparency, the 
statement also implies that the business 
case for non-disclosure can legitimately 
outweigh the social or environmental 
imperatives for disclosure. It doesn’t 
suggest how the information should be 
presented or the level of detail that is 
appropriate. In many ways the 10th prin-
ciple allows banks to assert they are be-
ing transparent, without any pressure for 
substance. Some banks may choose to 
disclose information in a substantial 
way, but this is not an essential commit-
ment. Although corporate disclosures 
are vital to an ongoing, informed dia-
logue between the community and the 
corporation about acceptable practices, it 
is important to acknowledge that claims 
of transparency can be problematic. As 
Hall (1997) has argued, everything in its 
communication is a representation. All 
information is mediated through lan-
guage, discourse and institutional im-
peratives it can never be wholly reveal-
ing in the way that the word transpar-
ency implies (Andrew, 2001). If corpo-
rations are allowed to claim they are be-
ing transparent through their disclosures, 
it may assist in the constitution of a pas-
sive, uncritical audience adding to the 
challenges faced by those seeking to 
transform banking practices.  
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It is well documented there has been a 
significant increase in the number of 
firms seeking to demonstrate their ethi-
cal credentials (Neimark, 1995; Kap-
stein, 2001; Sethi, 2002). Although there 
is little doubt corporations are adopting 
voluntary codes as a strategy, the pur-
pose and impact of that strategy cannot 
be presumed (Husted & Allen, 2006). 
The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the International 
Finance Corporation all assess the social 
and environmental risks of their lending 
decisions before funding projects. These 
assessments have been controversial, but 
there is no doubt that this approach to 
lending is fundamental to the legitimacy 
and identity of these multilateral institu-
tions (Saravanamuthu, 2004; Annisette, 
2004). In some cases, private financial 
institutions play a role in development 
projects. They may fund projects that the 
World Bank had decided not to finance, 
or they may supplement the funds pro-
vided by the World Bank. Either way, 
the lending practices of private institu-
tions are increasingly scrutinized by non 
government organizations (NGO’s) 
(Missbach, 2004).  
 
As Branco & Rodrigues (2006, p. 234) 
have noted “studies focusing on social 
responsibility disclosure practices by 
financial institutions are scarce” and this 
work will assist in the development of 
research in this area. It will focus on the 
impact of the Equator Principles before 
the release of the June 2006 revisions as 
banks have yet to release information 
using these guidelines. This work will 
consider the information that has been 
available in the public domain up to the 
release of the revised principles and will 
not extend beyond this as there has not 
been sufficient time for banks to respond 
to the changes. This study will form a 
foundation on which to consider that 
changes that may occur as a result of the 
revisions and this can be the focus of 
future research. 
 
 
The Equator Principles and 
Project Financing Disclosures: 
Any News? 
 
Cultural studies lays bare the de-
ception encoded in these domi-
nant cultural artifacts, It criticizes 
the needs these cultural practices 
purvey through the guileful repre-
sentations of a frozen second na-
ture – reality as it “must” be – and 
instead suggests alternative for-
mations of both human needs and 
social reality (Agger, 1992, 
p.145) 
 
In order to explore the impact of the 
Equator Principles on the practices of 
signatory banks, I have examined the 
public disclosures of HSBC and West-
pac. These banks have been chosen as a 
starting point for this analysis because 
both HSBC and Westpac were actively 
involved in the design of the principles 
and have been associated with the prin-
ciples since their inception in 2003. It 
should be acknowledged that this is an 
initial investigation and needs to be ex-
tended beyond these two banks in the 
future.  
 
This examination is understood through 
the theoretical lens of works by Hall 
(1997) and Agger (1992). In order to 
consider the impact of the Equator Prin-
ciples on the banks, the banks 
‘responsibility report’ from 2003 (the 
year the Equator Principles began) until 
2006 and publicly released information 
regarding the integration of the Equator 
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Principles into the banks practices. It 
became apparent that very little informa-
tion of any substance was available, all 
banks made references to the principles 
and talked about what they were doing 
to integrate the principles but this re-
search revealed that the information was 
shallow and did not enable a knowledge-
able reader to work out just how the 
principles were impacting on the banks 
practices in any substantial way. The 
following section considers each bank in 
detail. 
 
 
HSBC 
 
According to (Agger, 1992, p.184) 
“representation is a political practice 
where it encodes its content in the illu-
sion of authorless stancelessness”. And 
banks disclosures under the Equator 
Principles are a study in such representa-
tion. These disclosures are not apolitical, 
they are deliberate representations of the 
firm, but are presented and represented 
as benign, transparent statements about 
position and policies. However, as Ag-
ger argues they are not neutral, far from 
it they position the politics of the firm 
within the appearance of authorless rep-
resentation. HSBC is the third largest 
bank in the world by market capitaliza-
tion and they signed on to the Equator 
Principles in 2003, taking on more high 
profile roles as the chair of the Equator 
Principles Working Group in 2005 and 
as a participant in the redrafting of the 
Equator Principles in 2006. As such, 
they have positioned themselves as an 
author, but when reporting on practices 
relating to the principles their authorship 
is all but invisible. 
 
Having reviewed the information avail-
able regarding HSBC’s Equator Princi-
ples commitment, in general the level of 
substance supporting their claims was 
lacking. The bank used innumerable op-
portunities to refer to the Equator Princi-
ples without providing anything more 
than a stated commitment. In so doing 
they position themselves as committed, 
without having to produce evidence of 
such commitment. In this context, it is 
difficult to assess the way the principles 
are impacting on HSBC’s practices, let 
alone the impact these may have on the 
actual social and environmental conse-
quences of these practices.  
 
However, we can see that the representa-
tional performance is vital to HSBC’s 
identity as they refer to the Equator Prin-
ciples whenever an opportunity arises. 
For instance, HSBC claim that “we do 
not see this as an "add-on" to our busi-
ness, but a key part of a much wider ap-
proach to managing the sustainability of 
our lending”  (http://www.hsbc.com/
hsbc/csr/our-sustainable-approach-to-
banking/equator-principles, Accessed: 
9th February, 2007). However, a detailed 
search of the banks publicly available 
information revealed little to substantiate 
this claim. HSBC also states that they 
have “established internal procedures 
that require all relevant project related 
loans to be categorised in accordance 
with the Equator Principles” (http://
www . h s b c . c o m / h s b c / c s r / o u r -
sustainable-approach-to-banking/
equator-principles Accessed: 9th Febru-
ary, 2007) but, again there is no way to 
externally verify this stated commitment 
and there is no legal obligation on 
HSBC to do so as the principles are not 
mandatory.  
 
In an attempt to substantiate their com-
mitment they claim that they report an-
nually on the equator principles transac-
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tions in their CSR Report, and they pro-
vide aggregate information but this in-
formation lacks substance, it reveals 
nothing about the nature of the projects 
they are engaging, or the internal proc-
esses in place to assess them against the 
Equator Principles. There is little con-
cern about the ways the banks decisions 
may have changed the social and envi-
ronmental outcomes experienced at the 
project site. This kind of detail would 
enable a user to understand how the 
bank is creating a ‘better world’, rather 
than just internal procedures to meet the 
principles with little external verifica-
tion.  
 
On closer inspection of HSBC CSR Re-
ports they are disclosing some informa-
tion in relation to the principles. In 
HSBC’s 2003 CSR Report they are com-
mitted to report summary numbers for 
the total value and volume of project 
finance deals booked. In their discussion 
on the implementation of the Equator 
Principles they say they’ll update their 
procedures manual and train staff in-
volved in the project finance and that 
demonstration that they are adhering to 
the Equator Principles will be provided 
through the previously mentioned sum-
mary report. This is their commitment to 
public information. This is a cultural 
practice that can “situate the creation of 
cultural artifacts in complex and eco-
nomic spaces within which creative ac-
tivity is conditioned, even deter-
mined” (Agger, 1992, p.13). The asser-
tion of the corporate agenda on the proc-
esses possible through the Equator Prin-
ciples can be revealed in the limits, the 
invisible spaces that are not represented 
by the firm. Following on from this, 
HSBC’s CSR reports also focus consid-
erably on their commitment to training 
staff on the Equator Principles, but 
again, these are statements and there is 
little evidence to support these claims or 
information in order to understand how 
the training is being conducted and what 
aspects of the principles are being imple-
mented, at what level and for what pur-
pose. The intention is delimited, and the 
focus is created – irrespective of how 
this can be traced to improved social and 
environmental performance. 
 
To a large extent the Equator Principles 
are self referential in that the banks can 
employ “independent experts” or 
“independent consultants” to advise 
them. This advice is not made public, 
and the level of independence is not en-
sured, they purely make the statement 
that they “retain a panel of consultants 
covering various industry sectors, envi-
ronmental and social risk capabilities, 
and geographic locations, which our 
Project Finance teams can draw upon. 
The selection of consultants is managed 
centrally by Project Finance, with guid-
ance from the Environmental Risk Unit 
as appropriate.” (http://www.hsbc.com/
hsbc/csr/our-sustainable-approach-to-
banking/equator-principles Accessed: 9th 
February, 2007). There is no way of ex-
ternally verifying the quality of this ad-
vice, or the level of bias that may ensue 
from the commercial arrangements 
agreed to when providing the advice and 
so on. However, the firm is able to rep-
resent itself as legitimate, with external 
experts verifying their internal proce-
dures seamlessly creating a discourse of 
legitimacy to which they can fulfil and 
control. 
 
HSBC also reveals they are focused on 
the reputational benefits the Equator 
Principles provide, as opposed to the 
social and environmental contribution 
that banks can make through improved 
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commitment to responsible lending. For 
instance, they state that they want “to 
help mitigate environmental credit risk 
and adverse impacts on our reputation” 
so they “have developed guidelines and 
have adopted internationally recognised 
codes of conduct, such as the Equator 
Principles, to help us in our decision-
making.” (HSBC, Key CSR issues 30, 
June 2006, www.hsbc.com). The banks 
perception that an association with the 
principles has positive reputational bene-
fits is evident in the way they refer to the 
Equator Principles every time they re-
lease information about any project that 
is associated with responsible behaviour.  
Again, the self referential nature of the 
Equator Principles is evident upon any 
detailed consideration of the banks state-
ments regarding the principles. It be-
came apparent that everything HSBC 
did that linked to the community or the 
environment presented an opportunity to 
promote the Equator Principles. For ex-
ample: 
 
1. The release of their forest sector 
guidelines allows them to say “the 
guideline announced today demon-
strates our commitment to the Equa-
tor Principles in relation to the for-
est land and forest products sec-
tor” (HSBC launches forest sector 
guideline, 28 May 2004), even 
though there is no direct relation-
ship. 
2.  When discussing their effort to be a 
‘carbon neutral’ bank they say “this 
complements the actions it is al-
ready taking to address the indirect 
impact it has on environmental and 
social issues arising when financing 
projects for customers. For example, 
in 2003, HSBC adopted the Equator 
Principles.” (HSBC world’s first 
major bank to go carbon neutral, 6 
December 2004), in so doing, they 
readvertise their commitment to the 
principles although there is no direct 
link between the two. 
3. The release of HSBC’s chemical 
industry sector guidelines is an op-
portunity for them to note that it 
reinforces the “the Group’s adoption 
in 2003 of the Equator Principles - a 
set of voluntary guidelines applied 
to project finance activi-
ties.” (HSBC launches chemicals 
industry sector guideline, 03 August 
2005).  
4. They also claim that their freshwater 
infrastructure guidelines “reinforce 
HSBC’s commitment to the Equator 
Principles, a set of voluntary guide-
lines providing a common frame-
work for major banks to address 
environmental and social issues 
arising from financing pro-
jects.” (HSBC launches freshwater 
infrastructure guideline, 27 May 
2005). 
5. The launch of a climate change part-
nership with Newcastle University 
and the University of East Anglia 
enabled them to say that “in 2003, 
HSBC adopted the Equator Princi-
ples” (HSBC launches climate 
change partnership, 08 December 
2004) even though there is no direct 
link between these two projects. 
 
Obviously, HSBC is representing their 
bank as a socially and environmentally 
responsible lender. The strategies out-
lined above would suggest they are us-
ing any given opportunity to use the 
Equator Principles to reposition the firm 
in this light. Unfortunately, at the stage 
it is impossible to tell if these are having 
a positive impact on the internal prac-
tices of the bank, a situation that may 
change as the disclosure requirements of 
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the Equator Principles change. 
 
 
Westpac 
 
“A radical cultural studies inter-
venes politically where it chal-
lenges representation to theorize 
itself, understanding how the rep-
ertoire of interpretive activities in 
which we habitually and thought-
lessly engage is, in fact, a careful 
political construction – call it ide-
ology” (Agger, 1992, p.183) 
 
Westpac is the only Australian bank to 
adopt the Equator Principles, having 
become a signatory in 2003. Westpac’s 
2004 Stakeholder Impact Report, ac-
knowledges the banks commitment to 
the Equator Principles but provides no 
material evidence of the incorporation of 
these into their practices. They state the 
“we felt it was important to support this 
initiative so that standards such as these 
are adopted by all banks in the market-
place and the likelihood of competition 
between banks on environmental and 
social grounds is minimised” (SIR 2004, 
p.35). In this statement, the bank clearly 
articulated a strategic interest in the de-
velopment of the Equator Principles, but 
such an interest would leave any inter-
ested party to wonder whether such this 
interest was to further development, in-
novation, commitment. The emergent 
representations are political (Agger, 
1992) 
 
In Westpac’s 2005 Stakeholder Impact 
Report, they reaffirm their commitment 
to the Equator Principles, again they use 
this opportunity to emphasise that they 
are the sole Australian signatory. Like 
HSBC, Westpac offers some aggregate 
information outlining projects impacted 
on by the Equator Principles. They state 
that 13 projects were financed in the 
year (all in Australia and the Pacific Is-
lands), 6 new projects, 1 to buy an exist-
ing asset and six were for the refinanc-
ing of an existing asset. They state that 4 
had capital costs below $50million, but 
they do not say if these underwent the 
same assessment process or not. The 
summary information is very ambigu-
ous, giving detail but not substantial 
enough to consider how the Equator 
Principles are working. They declined “a 
number of transactions” but claim this 
was not because of breaches of the 
Equator Principles offering no insight 
into the internal processes used for as-
sessment, whether any projects under-
went additional investigation based on 
the Equator Principles, whether they 
hired external advises to assist in the 
assessment of the projects, or whether 
the projects needed to undergo any 
changes to meet the banks standards. In 
essence, very little information was pro-
vided. 
 
In Westpac’s 2006 Stakeholder Impact 
Report, they congratulate themselves on 
making their commitment to the 
“Actually quite stunning” (their words 
2006, p.7) Equator Principles and that 
they had successfully marketed them-
selves as an environmentally responsible 
bank through their 2006 advertising 
campaign. They claim this has led to 
request for more information and that it 
has been met “with an astounding re-
sponse” (2006, p.27), but they do not 
disclose whether they are providing this 
additional information and in what form. 
The aggregate information proves no 
more substantial than the previous year, 
with them claiming that they closed 14 
deals, 6 new, 1 an expansion of an exist-
ing asset, and 7 refinancing of an exist-
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ing asset. Equator Principles applied to 
all except one as it was below 
$10million. Again they state that “a 
number of transactions were declined 
during the past year, several for reasons 
including environmental  con-
cerns” (p.31) but do not elaborate on 
this. Interestingly, unlike HSBC, they 
don’t tell the audience how much the 
projects are worth to them. We have no 
idea of the size of this section of West-
pac’s business and how substantially it 
will impact on the firm. We are to be-
lieve they are doing a good job as the 
external audit report stated that “as a 
result of testing Equator Principles im-
plementation we concluded that the 
overall approach and process is robust. 
In addition, we identified a small num-
ber of improvement opportuni-
ties” (p.91). 
 
As outlined in the case of HSBC, West-
pac also uses any mention of anything 
related to corporate social or environ-
mental responsibility provides them with 
an opportunity to mention the Equator 
Principles. These references provide lit-
tle opportunity for external verification 
of internal change or commitment to the 
substance of the Equator Principles. In-
stead their lack of substance reinforces 
the impression that these principles are 
being exploited for their marketing po-
tential. For example: 
 
1. Westpac acknowledges the impor-
tance of carbon neutral business 
practices and then outlines the banks 
commitment to all environmental 
policies including its commitment 
“to the revised Equator Principles, a 
framework for assessing social and 
environmental risk in project fi-
nance - the only Australian bank to 
do so” (Westpac, 13 December 
2006, Westpac report finds risks and 
opportunities in climate change);  
2. When discussing corporate environ-
mental policy and governance on 
their website Westpac highlights 
their commitment to the Equator 
P r i n c i p l e s  s t a t i n g  t h a t 
“environmental considerations are 
factored into our investment and 
lending decisions and we also ad-
here to the Equator Principles in 
managing environmental and social 
risk in project finance” (http://
www.westpac.com.au/internet/
publish.nsf/content/wicrevpg%
20our%20commitment);  
3. Westpac promotes its receipt of the 
award for the “Best Project Finance 
Bank in Australasia for 2006” by 
Global Finance magazine, with ref-
erence to their commitment to the 
Equator Principles’s. This reference 
has little to do with the award, but 
allows the bank to state that they are 
signatories to them and that they are 
committed to promoting responsible 
p r o j e c t  f i n a n c e .  ( h t t p : / /
www.westpac.com.au/internet/
publish.nsf/content/wicrln%20cr%
20arch ived%20news%2023%
20october%202006, 23 October 
2006, Westpac wins project finance 
award);  
4. They also received a AAA 
(outstanding) rating from RepuTex 
Social Responsibility Rating, 
wherein along with other factors, 
Westpac was noted for the only 
Australian bank to sign the Equator 
Principles; 
5. When discussing the opening of an 
educational residential eco-village 
funded by the bank in South East 
Queensland, the state “Westpac re-
mains the only Australian bank to 
become a signatory of the Equator 
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P r i n c i p l e s . ” ( h t t p : / /
www.westpac.com.au/internet/
publish.nsf/content/wimcmr06%
20archive%20media%20release%
2024%20july%20200b, 24 July 
2006, Westpac finances Australia's 
first educational residential eco-
village). This reference to the Equa-
tor Principles has nothing to do with 
the project, but reinforces the image 
of a globally responsible lender. 
 
This research shows that Westpac is de-
ploying very similar strategies to that 
adopted by HSBC, using the Equator 
Principles to reposition the firm as so-
cially and environmentally responsible. 
Just as HSBC may well be undergoing 
internal changes that can substantiate 
such a claim, Westpac may be engaging 
in similar internal transformations re-
quired to live up to these claims – but 
they are not making these clear to the 
public, so a reader could be forgiven for 
thinking that the Equator P                                                   
rinciples lack substance. Time will tell, 
and more research will be required in 
order to assess the impact of the Equator 
Principles on banking practices. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We can phrase the political 
agenda of this cultural studies 
negatively: it wants to help people 
avoid domination – self defeating, 
self-reproducing practices that 
violate their own best interests 
(Agger, 1992, p.196) 
 
The Equator Principles mark the begin-
ning of the financial industries recogni-
tion of their social and environmental 
impact. When the disclosure practices of 
two banks were considered in light of 
this voluntary code and the representa-
tional performance through which they 
operate, it has been revealed that banks 
are saying little of substance about their 
impact on the social and environmental 
practices of the bank. Instead they form 
part of a greater dialogue about how to 
represent the bank that is not devoid of 
real world consequences, some of which 
may have positive social and environ-
mental outcomes. However, as Agger 
(1992) has pointed out the cultural logic 
of late capitalism pits the expansionist 
agenda of corporate strategy against the 
social and environmental responsibilities 
of the modern corporation. Codes such 
as the Equator Principles are not author-
less, stanceless offerings in a politically 
neutral world. Instead, they are sophisti-
cated attempts to position the firm 
within the contemporary pressures of the 
modern socio-political environment and 
they are inescapably political. They are a 
deliberate act of representation, but they 
are participatory and through an audi-
ences critical readings of the disclosures 
of banks new representations will form, 
that may lead to changes that have posi-
tive social and environmental conse-
quences.  
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